Grinding gears by Charles Gerena
Y
ou have probably seen this scene played out before
in the news: Laid-off workers, forlorn, leave their
shift at a manufacturing plant for the last time. 
The meaningful relationships and lengthy careers they had
built up are gone, and the workers know it.
That was the scene at General Motors’ assembly plant in
Baltimore, Md., on May 13, 2005. The 70-year-old facility
rolled out its last vehicle, a van tagged with a cardboard sign
reading “The End.” It was a difficult day for the 1,400 plant
workers facing an uncertain future. 
Displaced workers often suffer long periods of unemploy-
ment. When they finally get another job, it is more likely
lower-paying and part-time. Even those who land full-time
jobs are less likely to match their previous salaries, especially
when they enter a different line of work. That’s bad news for
people in industries such as automobile manufacturing who
have permanently lost positions due to automation and the
competitive pressures of a global economy.
Blunting the impact of layoffs is one of the reasons why a
“jobs bank” for displaced autoworkers was created in the
early 1980s. The program was the result of contract negotia-
tions between the United Automobile, Aerospace, and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) and the
“Big Three” — Ford Motor Company, General Motors, and
the Chrysler Group. In the jobs bank program, laid-off
autoworkers typically receive all or at least a large share of
their usual wages and benefits indefinitely. Eventually, the
idea was, these idled workers would be plugged into new
jobs when they became available.
Automakers expected to avoid extensive job cuts and plant
closings in the future, so they figured the number of people in
the jobs bank wouldn’t be overwhelming. They also believed
that most employees would be there for only a short stay.
Unionized workers, in turn, were willing to accept pay freezes
and other concessions in exchange for greater job security. 
“We had to look at ways of protecting people, even if we
were going to do some givebacks,” says Fred Swanner, presi-
dent of UAW Local 239 based in Baltimore. His union
represents the 100 people who remain in the jobs bank two
years after General Motors closed its assembly plant in the
city. “It was a way of protecting the employees and keeping
the corporations from outsourcing [work] overseas, or at least
try to slow them down by attaching some liabilities to it.”
The program appears to have given autoworkers 
what they wanted. Swanner says his members appreciated
the added stability in their employment and have used 
their stretch in the jobs bank to volunteer or go back 
to school.
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paid a heavy price with the jobs bank
program. Although they have been able
to shed workers through attrition,
automakers have laid off more people
than expected. This has forced the
companies to pay millions of dollars to
idle their employees, as well as to offer
increasingly large buyouts to persuade
jobs bank participants and other workers
to leave.
Since 2005, vehicle and parts pro-
ducers have announced more than
280,000 layoffs, according to surveys
by employment consultant Challenger,
Gray & Christmas. Against this back-
drop, everything is up for renegotiation
during this summer’s UAW contract
talks, including the jobs bank.
Great Expectations
When it was created under the 1984-
1987 UAW contract, the jobs bank
covered workers who lost their jobs as
a result of technological change, out-
sourcing, corporate reorganization, or
productivity improvements. It was
expanded in the 1990-1993 contract to
include workers who were laid off due
to declining sales.
Under the contract that expires
this September, laid-off autoworkers
receive supplementary unemployment
benefits on top of their state benefits
for 48 weeks. Then they enter a jobs
bank designated for each automaker.
Depending on the specifics of the
union contract at a plant, jobs bank
participants can sometimes continue
to receive up to 100 percent of their
salary and benefits until they leave the
company, accept another position at
their plant, or transfer to a different
facility within a 50-mile radius. 
What happens in the meantime? It
varies from plant to plant. Sometimes,
workers are allowed to use their down-
time to take classes or volunteer in the
community. Or they may be asked to
help the company in another capacity,
such as delivering vehicles at dealer-
ships or covering for other workers
who are receiving training.
In a few cases, there isn’t anything
productive for the jobs bank inhabi-
tants to do. When General Motors
closed its Baltimore plant in May 
2005 and displaced 1,400 workers, the
union hall near the plant was reportedly
a popular hangout for banked workers
waiting for odd jobs.
Being stuck in a jobs bank may not
seem attractive to someone accus-
tomed to punching a clock at a factory
every day. But in the early 1980s, UAW
officials wanted some degree of 
job security for their members after 
several years of mass layoffs. A sluggish
economy and a surge in imports had
prompted automakers to shed close to
300,000 positions, or one-third of their
work force, between 1979 and 1982.
Besides, the UAW figured the 
jobs bank would discourage companies
from cutting jobs and speed the 
reassignment of those who were laid off.
Companies weren’t expected to pay
people  not to build vehicles for an
extended period of time. In fact, that is
exactly what the Big Three have done,
slowing down assembly lines, eliminat-
ing shifts, and, eventually, closing plants
despite the additional expense of 
putting workers in the jobs bank.
Laurie Harbour-Felax, a manufac-
turing consultant and president of
Harbour-Felax Group, says there have
been dramatic improvements in pro-
ductivity in the last few decades and a
greater focus on quality, which drives
higher efficiency. The result: less labor
required to produce the same number
of cars. “As people are retiring,
automakers are hiring back fewer 
people,” she adds.
Labor demand has been eroded by
overseas competition as well. Asian
automakers like Toyota, Hyundai, and
Nissan have lured consumers away
from the Big Three, reducing the lat-
ter’s share of the domestic market.
They also operate American plants,
taking up some of the labor slack they
helped create, but not all of it.
“Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the
Japanese would put in a plant to make
the same volume as a Big Three plant,
but do it with dramatically fewer 
people,” Harbour-Felax says. 
This pushed U.S. automakers to be
even more productive and reduce their
labor needs. “The globalization that
has gone on in the last 25 years has put
tremendous pressure on this country,”
she notes.
The Big Three automakers didn’t
envision this situation, either. “The
thing we didn’t plan for was the loss of
market share and the need to close
plants,” says Dan Flores, General
Motor’s spokesman for manufacturing
and labor. “There weren’t jobs that
people could go to.”
When they renewed their UAW
contracts in the early 1980s, the Big
Three automakers were optimistic that
their long-run growth since World War
II would continue — their combined
profits had jumped from $6.3 billion 
in 1983 to $9.8 billion in 1984. “We
thought that [the jobs bank] would be a
temporary bullpen, where employees
would go before they were assigned to
a different job or plant,” Flores says.
Automakers were also willing to
create the jobs bank in exchange for
union concessions on the use of
automation and flexible scheduling.
Lastly, the added level of job security
was supposed to improve productivity
by enhancing workers’ motivation 
and commitment.
Improving the worker-employer
relationship was expected to have one
more benefit, adds Cornell University
economist Harry Katz. “[Automakers]
hoped workers would be more willing
to move around the system and live
with plant closings, line adjustments,
work-rule changes … and other things
they were doing in exchange for
longer-term security,” he notes. 
Katz says it’s hard to tell whether
the creation of the jobs bank 
contributed to productivity improve-
ments in the automotive industry. 
It hasn’t led to substantially greater
flexibility, in his opinion.
What the program has done is add
to the ranks of the underemployed.
Chrysler had 2,000 people in its 
jobs bank at the end of 2006. 
(As of press time, the private equity
firm Cerberus Capital Management
LP had agreed to buy 80.1 percent 
of the Chrysler Group from
DaimlerChrysler AG.) Ford and its
former parts subsidiary, Visteon, had a
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ticipants. Published estimates for
General Motors and Delphi, a parts
supplier spun off from GM, indicate
that they have the largest jobs banks —
a combined 11,100 people as of 
March 2006. In total, more than
14,000 autoworkers have been laid off
but are still on company payrolls. The
number is expected to drop in 2007 as 
workers finally accept severance and
retirement packages.
Stuck in Neutral
Automakers have waved numerous
enticements in front of idled workers
to prompt their departure. In 2006,
General Motors offered $140,000
buyouts to workers with 10 years of
seniority, including those in the jobs
bank. Ford also offered buyouts of 
up to $140,000 last year, as well as
annual tuition assistance of $15,000.
In March 2007, Chrysler started 
offering early retirement payouts of
$70,000 and lump-sum buyouts 
of $100,000 to help reduce its North
American headcount.
Many people in the jobs bank seize
the opportunity to move on with their
lives. About 600 of the 1,400 people
let go from General Motors’ Baltimore
facility in 2005 have retired or 
accepted buyouts, according to the
UAW’s Fred Swanner. About 700 
people accepted transfers to other
GM facilities, including a transmission
plant in Baltimore County and an
assembly plant in Wilmington, Del.
That leaves about 100 workers in the
jobs bank by Swanner’s calculations.
The workers who accept buyouts or
transfers are usually the ones who are
the most mobile. They are willing and
able to start anew, whether it’s at a
plant in a different city or in an entirely
different career. This includes younger
people with lots of healthy, productive
years ahead of them, as well as older,
experienced workers who are confi-
dent in their marketability.
Then there are the workers who
don’t move on. One group of General
Motors’ employees reportedly stayed
in the jobs bank 12 years after their
plant in Van Nuys, Calif., closed in
1992. Some Delphi workers in Flint,
Mich., have been idling for more than
six years.
Based on his experience, Swanner
says the people who stay the longest in
the jobs bank aren’t usually production
workers who stamp out or assemble
parts. Rather, they are the millwrights
who fix conveyors, the electricians
who maintain assembly line robots,
and other skilled trades workers.
“We’re down to our trades guys, who
are hard to place. Those openings only
occur in some factories one or two at a
time,” Swanner notes.
There are other reasons why people
choose to remain in the jobs bank.
Workers close to retirement may be
willing to stay in limbo for a few more
years until they can collect their 
pension and health-care benefits.
Others may cling to the hope that
automakers will regain their market
share and ask them to return — several
people at General Motors’ Baltimore
plant told the Baltimore Sun last year
they didn’t want to accept buyout
offers and give up a chance to work at
GM’s transmission plant in Baltimore
County. 
Similarly, some workers may be
holding out for a buyout that is worth
giving up their current salary and ben-
efits. In general, the comparatively
high compensation of autoworkers —
even within the manufacturing sector
— makes staying put in the jobs bank a
better choice, even if it only delays
dealing with the harsh realities that lie
beyond the automotive industry.
For one thing, the jobs bank sets a
high bar for a worker’s reservation
wage, the minimum salary for which
people are willing to supply their labor.
Economists believe that a person’s
reservation wage depends on the prob-
ability of getting a job offer, the
expected range of wages available in
the market, and the availability of
alternative income sources, such as
state unemployment benefits and 
personal savings. So, the higher the
alternative income — in this case, the
salary that laid-off workers in the jobs
bank continue to receive — the higher
the reservation wage, all other things
being equal.
Also, autoworkers may not get the
same wages and benefits if they transfer
to another plant. The labor market has
undergone a significant shift from
unionized positions at American firms
in the “Rust Belt” to positions at foreign
producers with plants in lower-cost,
“right-to-work” Southern states where
unionization is less common. 
For example, BMWManufacturing
has been hiring people at its plant in
Spartanburg County, S.C. But the
nonunionized facility needs only tem-
porary workers and pays $12 to $13 an
hour compared to the industry average
of $22 an hour.
Finally, laid-off workers may feel
less secure about their employability
and be afraid to take chances and
switch careers. “We get some who will
be in that mode. Their self-esteem 
is lower,” Swanner notes. “They might
not feel they can make another 
career change at the age they are 
now.” Or they might feel that they 
lack the necessary skills to handle
today’s technology.
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The Details
The size of the Big Three automakers’ jobs bank 
program is expected to decline in 2007. It will
depend on how many laid-off workers accept buy-
out packages or choose to retire. Here is a snapshot
of where the program stood at the end of 2006.
Chrysler Group
Jobs Bank Name: Job and Income Security 
Funding Committed Under UAW Contract: $451 million
Estimated No. of Participants: 2,000 (2,100 in 2005)
Ford Motor Company
Jobs Bank Name: Protected Employee Program (PEP)
Funding Committed Under UAW Contract: $944 million
Estimated No. of Participants: 1,100 (1,275 in 2005;
includes PEP workers at former parts subsidiary
Visteon)
General Motors Corp.
Jobs Bank Name: Job Opportunity Bank-Security (JOBS)
Funding Committed Under UAW Contract: $2.7 billion 
Estimated No. of Participants: 11,100 (9,000 in 2005;
includes JOBS workers at former parts subsidiary
Delphi)
SOURCES: Company estimates, news reports, and 
UAW Web site
— CHARLES GERENA
RF SPRING 07_1-51_Rev7.9  7/12/07  3:05 PM  Page 26Automakers provide educational
programs for laid-off workers to learn
new skills. However, the type of training
varies from plant to plant — one
General Motors’ facility in Flint
reportedly offered classes on working
in a casino, while a Ford plant 
in Wayne, Mich., taught classes in
bicycle repair and silk flower arranging.
The career paths that workers are
being prepared for may not be 
as financially rewarding as staying 
in the automotive industry or 
in manufacturing.
When 2,300 workers stop making
F-150 trucks at Ford’s Norfolk, Va.,
plant this year, few alternatives will be
available for those who decide to enter
a jobs bank. “There is nothing around
here,” says Chris Kimmons, president
of the plant’s union. They could join
the International Longshoreman’s
Association and make $16 an hour at a
wharf, but that compares poorly to the
$28 an hour they make now. “You do
the best you can for your family 
and yourself.”
The Price of Layoffs
Laid-off workers are likely feeling the
pressure to get out of the jobs bank,
with the UAW’s contracts with 
the Big Three expiring in September.
Apparently, most of the workers at
Ford’s truck assembly plant in Norfolk
don’t want to take any chances when
the facility shuts down. About 1,900
workers have accepted one of the 
severance packages that Ford offered
to workers in 2006. Another 360 will
transfer to the company’s truck plant
in Dearborn, Mich. Kimmons estimates
that fewer than 50 workers will enter
the jobs bank after receiving 48 weeks
of unemployment benefits.
“They wanted to take the money
and run,” Kimmons says. “Maybe they
feel the auto industry isn’t as sound as
it used to be. There is a lot of devasta-
tion going on.”  
While the UAW will likely resist
any changes to the jobs bank,
automakers have good reasons to push
for a compromise. With $4.1 billion
committed to funding the jobs bank
under the current UAW contract, the
program adds another burden to 
the long list of challenges facing
automakers, from rising health-care
costs to designing vehicles that can
compete with imports on quality and
customer satisfaction.
As consumer tastes change and
demand fluctuates, automakers con-
stantly reevaluate their production
levels and employment needs.
According to GM spokesman Dan
Flores, there has been room for the
company to make short-term tweaks,
such as eliminating a shift at a plant
producing an unpopular model. 
Flores admits that the jobs bank
did raise the cost of long-term layoffs
enough that it has affected GM’s pro-
duction plans. But he downplays its
impact on GM’s decisionmaking
process, saying it is just one of many
considerations. “Certainly, there is a
significant cost associated with [the
jobs bank],” he notes. However,
“there are a lot of factors that come
into play.”
In an October 2006 report, the
Harbour-Felax Group calculated the
price tag for permanently closing a
typical assembly plant that produces
1,000 vehicles a day. Its analysis
assumed a total of 4,450 workers —
both at the plant and in related
component, engine, and transmission
plants — would end up in a jobs bank
for one year. 
The bottom line: Chrysler would
have to devote $175 of every vehicle it
sells in North America to pay for the
plant closing, while Ford would have
to cough up $134 per vehicle and GM
would have to pay $88 per vehicle. To
put these costs in perspective,
Chrysler lost an average of $950 per
vehicle sold in North America last 
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Buyout Blitz
Automakers looking to downsize have been working hard to persuade their workers to voluntarily leave their jobs. Unionized workers have
required more encouragement, especially those in the jobs bank programs at Ford, GM, and Chrysler.
Date of  Scope of  Lump Sum
Buyout Offer Buyout Offer Payments Offered
■ Chrysler Group Mar 2007 11 plants nationwide • $100,000 + six months of benefits for workers with at least one year of seniority
• $70,000 + full benefits for workers eligible for early retirement
■ Ford Motor Company Sep 2006 All active employees • $140,000 for any worker with 30 yrs. service or age 55 with 10 yrs. of service; 
future benefits forfeited
• $100,000 + six months of benefits for workers eligible for retirement
■ General Motors Corp. Mar 2006 All active employees • $140,000 for workers with 10 yrs. of service or more; future benefits forfeited
• $70,000 for workers with less than 10 yrs. of service; future benefits forfeited
• $35,000 for normal or early retirements retroactive to 10/1/05; future benefits retained
■ Mitsubishi Motors  Jul 2006 Plant in Normal, Ill. • $85,000 + 3 months of benefits
North America
■ Nissan  Feb 2007 Plants in Decherd  • $45,000 + $500/year of service
North America and Smyrna, Tenn.
SOURCE: News reports and press releases ■ Unionized / ■ Nonunionized
continued on page 31
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spatial allocation tool.”
High land prices have brought new
owners to TDRs, says Susan Hance-
Wells, but many are “farmettes” rather
than large-tract farms. “Some of the
land that will get in is not what we orig-
inally intended, but they preserve farm
communities. It’s insulating the farms
in that community against increased
density,” she says. “You’re going to have
cases that don’t suit what you’re looking
for or don’t accomplish the goals, but
they’re not going to be in the majority.”
OK, so maybe the development
isn’t ideally situated. And perhaps it
isn’t a true market, as Thorsnes 
points out, because the zones are 
predetermined by planners. But 
the fact  remains that farmland is 
being preserved.
Likewise, maybe Safe Harbor won’t
satisfy everybody, but it’s increasing
populations of the red-cockaded
woodpecker. And mitigation banks are
criticized for “enabling” development.
Yet the private banks, the successful
ones, are preserving larger sites and
providing permanent management for
endangered animals. As markets for
endangered species and open land
mature and go mainstream, they may
reveal nature’s true value. RF
year, while Ford lost $2,015 per vehicle
and GM lost $335 per vehicle.
Some industry observers argue that
if it weren’t for the cost of the jobs
bank, mass layoffs would have been
more common in the automotive indus-
try. Sean McAlinden, chief economist
at the Center for Automotive Research
in Ann Arbor, Mich., agreed with this
argument in a June 2004 report.
If the Big Three held firm on prices
during the onset of the 2001 recession,
McAlinden noted, they would 
have laid off tens of thousands of
workers who would have collected
supplementary unemployment bene-
fits and, eventually, full pay and
benefits in the jobs bank. “The 
companies, already facing pension
shortfalls, and remembering the disas-
trous cash drain of such layoffs in 
1992 for GM, cut prices instead of 
production and employment.”
This overcapacity has been partially
masked by strong sales of high-margin
trucks and sport-utility vehicles. But
continued poor sales of the Big 
Three’s cars are forcing automakers to
make more drastic changes. With or
without the jobs bank, it’s a more 
challenging environment for both
American automakers and the people
they employ. RF
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